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Abstract 
 
This review present some evidence on fraud, forensic accounting, the skills and education of the 
forensic investigator. Also, some explanation for the diverging views among academics and regulators 
in relation to detecting fraud are provided. To regulators, I address the question on why academic 
research in forensic accounting may have little significance to inform policy. Further, I present some 
rich set of questions and identify a number of important directions for future research in forensic 
accounting. This paper is intended to stimulate debates and future research of the issues identified.  
Keywords: Forensic Accounting; Fraud; Forensic Education; Fraud Triangle; Fraud Investigation.  
JEL Classification: I23, M41, M42, M48, M49.  
 
1. Introduction  
This article review the literature on fraud and forensic accounting. For the purpose of this review, 
forensic accounting involves the process of understanding, identifying, detecting and communicating 
fraud patterns and schemes to stakeholders to aid any investigation process or activity. Accounting 
standards allow managers to exercise discretion in financial reporting. However, there are concerns 
that managerial discretion can be abused and could be used to engage in, and to hide fraudulent 
practices; hence, the need for forensic accounting in fraud detection practice. The quality of any 
forensic activity would require the fraud expert or investigator to be knowledgeable on how 
perpetrators engage in fraud, how it manifests, how it is disguised and how to detect fraud. Motivated 
by these concern, this review article examine prior studies on forensic accounting and draw 
implications for research and policy.  
Forensic accounting academics emphasize the need for forensic accounting education. However, little 
is known about whether forensic accounting education has unintended consequences and the literature 
is quiet on this issue. This gap in the forensic accounting literature is addressed in this article. Further, 
this review address a thought-provoking issue on whether all fraud cases should be given equal 
investigative priority. Just as medical doctors do not consider all illness to be life-threatening and 
therefore do not commit significant resources or the same amount of resources to each category of 
illness. Similarly, using this analogy, it is easy to understand why regulators react differently to 
reported fraud cases. Finally, the discussion in the article contribute to the forensic accounting 
literature.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 discuss fraud and forensic accounting. 
Section 4 review the literature on the skills and education of the forensic investigator. Section 5 
discuss some practical and policy issues. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Fraud  
2.1. Define Fraud  
‘Financial statement fraud is a deliberate attempt by corporations to deceive or mislead users of 
published financial statements, especially investors and creditors, by preparing and disseminating 
material-ly misstated financial statements’ (Rezaee, 2005: 279). An extensive literature on fraud 
exists (see. Apostolou et al, 2000; Rezaee, 2005; Ozkul and Pamukcu, 2012, etc.), and studies in the 
literature show some consensus that fraud may involve: (1) the alteration or manipulation of material 
financial records, supporting documents or business transactions; (2) the intentional misstatements, 
omissions or misrepresentation of events, transactions, accounts or other significant information from 
which financial statements are prepared; (3) the deliberate misapplication and misinterpretation of 
accounting standards, principles, policies and methods used to measure, recognize, and report 
economic events and business transactions; (4) the intentional omissions and disclosures or 
presentation (5) the use of aggressive accounting techniques such as illegitimate earnings 
management strategies; and (6) the manipulation of accounting practices under rule-based or 
principle-based accounting standards that allow companies to hide the economic substance of their 
performance. 
Fraud schemes vary in scope, context and with the position of fraud perpetrators within an 
organisation (or firm). Some types of fraud are specific to certain industries due to industry-related 
incentives (e.g. Calavita et al, 1997). For instance, securities and investment fraud is common to the 
banking and financial services industry. Other types of fraud are concentrated at top and middle 
management levels within organisations (e.g. Crumbley, 2003; Zahra et al, 2005, etc.). Other types of 
fraud committed by employees include: creating fictitious expenses and obtaining disbursements, 
creating ghost employees to receive additional wages and salary, creating ghost suppliers and 
receiving their payments, benefiting from overstated personal expenditure, etc., (Ozkul and Pamukc, 
2012). Also, fraud may involve the use of accounting numbers. Fraud involving accounting numbers 
often manifest through the manipulation of accounting numbers used to generate financial reports, for 
example, inventory overvaluation and improper capitalization of capital expense (e.g. Harris & 
Brown, 2000; Messmer, 2004), earnings management (e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999), income 
smoothing (Ahmed et al, 1999; Curcio and Hasan, 2015; Ozili, 2015, etc.)  
2.2. Fraud Motivations 
2.2.1. The Fraud Triangle 
Compensation Incentives/Pressure 
Personal needs, social needs, economic needs and the need to meet compensation-based targets 
provide some incentive to commit fraud. There is evidence that the use of incentive systems increases 
the likelihood to commit fraud among managers. For example, Denis et al. (2005) and Johnson et al. 
(2003) find that compensation pressures and incentives are significantly associated with firms that 
have a fraud history. Hernandez and Groot (2007) find some association between the use of incentive 
systems and fraud risk. Specifically, they examine auditors’ perspective on incentives that increase the 
likelihood to commit fraud. They find that senior management unethical attitudes, use of incentive 
systems and dishonest communications are important indicators of the likelihood to commit fraud. 
Efendi et al. (2007) find that the likelihood of misstating financial statement to commit fraud 
increases when the CEO has a sizable amount of stock options and when firms are constrained by debt 
covenants. Other evidence for incentive-related fraud include: Lie (2005) and Burns and Kedia 
(2006). In contrast, Erickson et al. (2000) examine the association between equity incentives and 
financial statement fraud. After examining firms that were accused of fraud during the 1996-2003 
period, they did not find an association between equity incentives and accounting fraud. These 
conflicting results suggest that not all type of compensation system motivate managers to commit 
fraud. Additional research on compensation incentives is needed to provide insights on specific 
incentives that motivate managers to engage in fraud and the incentives that demotivate managers to 
commit fraud.  
Opportunities  
When the incentive to commit fraud exist, the perpetuator will seek an ‘opportunity’ to perform the 
fraudulent act. There is a consensus in the literature that the opportunity to commit fraud is more 
likely when there are ineffective monitoring and control systems (Beasley, 1996; Albrecht and 
Albrecht, 2003; etc.) particularly when there are fewer independent board members (Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow et al, 1996; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Farber, 2005), fewer audit committee 
meetings and fewer financial experts on the audit committee (Abbott et al, 2004; Farber, 2005; etc.). 
Beasley (1996) finds that the proportion of independent members on the board of directors is lower 
for firms that engage in fraudulent practices. Evidence from these studies suggest that less monitoring 
of firms create opportunities for fraud to be committed.  
Rationalization  
Rationalization is the third component of the fraud triangle. When fraud perpetrators have some 
incentive and find an opportunity to commit fraud, the perpetrator will seek explanations to justify 
their actions. Some justification includes claiming that: ‘I borrowed the money’, ‘I would pay back’, 
‘nobody has suffered as a result of this’, ‘I didn’t know it is a crime’, etc. (refer to: Ozkul and 
Pamukcu, 2012; p.24 for more on this). Overall, while there is a general consensus that there is some 
correlation between incentives, opportunities and rationalization, there is no agreement about the 
order or sequence of occurrence for each component of the fraud triangle. Therefore, future research 
should attempt to establish a systematic and logical sequence between incentives, opportunities, 
rationalization and capabilities while at the same permitting inter-dependence among each component 
of the fraud triangle.  
2.2.2. Fraud Polygon 
Several studies have made attempts to expand the fraud triangle. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) 
expanded the fraud triangle by adding a fourth dimension to the triangle which they termed the ‘fraud 
diamond’. The fourth dimension is ‘capability’. According to Wolfe and Hermanson (2004), 
‘capability’ addresses the reality that some people will not commit fraud even if all three original 
factors are strongly present. The perpetrator must have the capability to commit the fraudulent act 
with some confidence that it will go undetected. Also, Rezaee (2005) present an alternative to the 
fraud triangle. Rezaee (2005) investigate factors that may increase the likelihood of committing fraud 
by equating fraud tendencies to a concept he termed – CRIME where “C” stands for Cooking the 
books, “R” for Recipes, “I” for Incentives, “M” for Monitoring or lack of it, and “E” for End Results. 
Rezaee (2005) conclude, based on his CRIME analysis, that financial statement fraud is a serious 
threat to investors’ confidence in financial information. More recently, Kranacher et al (2010) 
formulated their “MICE” approach to explain the motivation (fraud) to commit fraud. According to 
Kranacher et al (2010), MICE - Money, Ideology, Coercion, and Ego/Entitlement are motivations to 
commit fraud. In their analysis, they maintain the structure of the fraud triangle but use a co-joined 
triangle similar to the fraud diamond. Overall, emerging sophisticated fraud cases and on-going fraud 
research continue to create opportunities to expand the fraud triangle towards a fraud polygon 
structure. The idea behind a fraud polygon is to establish a systematic and logical sequence among 
emerging fraud motivators while at the same permitting interdependence among each fraud motivator.  
 3. Forensic Accounting Perspectives 
Bolgna and Linquist (1995) define forensic accounting as the application of financial skills and 
investigative mentality to unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. 
Forensic accounting involves the application of accounting and auditing, financial and investigative 
skills to unsettled issues conducted within the context of the rules of evidence (see. Arokiasamy and 
Cristal-Lee, 2009; Ozkul and Pamukc, 2012). Following this definition, the focus of forensic 
accounting is to identify and review fraudulent transactions to identify the real intent of the 
perpetrator. Such reviews may take the form of document reviews, interviews, examination of 
electronic documents, etc. From an auditor’s perspective, forensic accounting deals with the 
application of auditing methods, techniques or procedures to resolve legal issues that require the 
integration of investigative, accounting, and auditing skills (Arokiasamy and Cristal-Lee, 2009; Dhar 
and Sarkar, 2010). From the perspective of an attorney or a litigator, forensic accounting involves 
gathering, interpreting, summarizing and presenting complex financial issues in a clear, succinct and 
factual manner often in a court of law as an expert (Howard and Sheetz, 2006; Stanbury and Paley-
Menzies, 2010), and such forensic evidence must meet standards required by courts of law and be 
presented in a manner that will be accepted by a court of jurisprudence. From the perspective of a 
fraud examiner, forensic accounting is the application of investigative and analytical skills to resolve 
financial issues in a manner that meets standards required by courts of law (Hopwood et al, 2008). 
Finally, forensic accounting investigation will involve the services of the informed auditor, attorney 
and fraud examiner.  
 
4. Skills and Education of the Forensic Investigator  
4.1. Skills  
The skills of the forensic investigator can be divided into two categories: core skills and enhanced 
skills. This categorization is similar to Davis et al. (2010)’s classification.  
• Core Skills  
Core skills are skills considered to be fundamental to become a forensic investigator. For example, 
Messmer (2004) identify strong analytical abilities, written and verbal communication skills, creative 
mind-set and business acumen. Durkin and Ueltzen (2009) stress that the forensic investigator should 
possess the knowledge of (i) professional responsibilities and practice management; (ii) laws, courts 
and dispute resolution; (iii) planning and preparation; (iv) information gathering and preservation 
such as documents, interviews/phone calls, interrogations, electronic data, etc., and (v) discovery 
(reporting, experts and testimony). Davis et al (2010) undertook a survey involving 779 respondents 
from forensic professionals and fraud examiners to identify core skills of a forensic accountant or 
investigator. Their result was divided into three categories: core skills for forensic academics, 
practitioners (CPAs) and attorneys; enhanced skills and professional skills. According to Davis et al 
(2010), the top five core skills for the academics include: critical and strategic thinking, auditing 
skills, investigative ability, synthesis of results and thinking like the wrong-doer, etc., while the top 
five skills for the practitioner (e.g. a CPA) include: critical and strategic thinking; effective written 
communication; effective oral communication; and investigative intuitiveness. 
Top  
10 
Core Skill of the 
Forensic academic 
Top 
Ranked 
Response 
Core Skill of the 
Forensic 
Practitoner 
Top 
Ranked 
Response 
Core Skill of the 
Attorney 
Top 
Ranked 
Response 
Ist Critical/strategic thinker 1 (62%) Critical/strategic 
thinker 
1 (50%) Effective oral 
communicator 
1 (61%) 
2nd Auditing skills 2 (53%) Effective written 
communicator 
2 (43%) Simplify the 
information 
2 (57%) 
3rd Investigative ability 3 (45)% Effective oral 
communicator 
3 (43%) Critical/ strategic 
thinker 
3 (49%) 
4th Synthesize results of 
discovery and analysis 
4 (43%) Investigative ability 4 (41%) Identify key issues 4 (38%) 
5th Think like the 
wrongdoer 
5 (38%) Investigative 
intuitiveness 
5 (39%) Auditing skills 5 (37%) 
6th Investigative 
intuitiveness 
6 (36) Synthesize results 
of discovery and 
analysis 
6 (36%) Investigative ability 5 (37%) 
7th Effective written 
communicator 
7 (34%) Organize an 
unstructured 
situation 
7 (34%) Synthesize results 
of discovery and 
analysis 
5 (37%) 
8th Organize an 
unstructured situation 
8 (32%) Identify key issues 8 (32%) Understand the 
goals of a case 
8 (33%) 
9th Identify key issues 9 (30%) Auditing skills 9 (31%) Tell the story 9 (30%) 
10th Solve unstructured 
problems 
9 (30%) Solve unstructured 
problems 
9 (31%) See the big picture 9 (30%) 
 Adapted from Davis et a (2010): p. 10. 
 
• Enhanced skills  
Enhanced skills are skills developed by the forensic investigator through years of experience in the 
profession in industry or academic research. Grippo and Ibex (2003) argue that the most important 
skills of forensic accountants comes from experience in accounting, auditing, taxation, business 
operations, management, internal controls, interpersonal relationships and communication. 
Ramaswamy (2005) suggests skills such as: in-depth knowledge of financial statements, the ability to 
critically analyse them and a thorough understanding of fraud schemes. Other studies such as Curtis 
(2008) and DiGabriele (2008) observe that academics and practitioners agree on the importance of a 
working knowledge of the legal process and criminology as an enhanced skill. In Davis et al (2010), 
the top enhanced skills for the forensic academic, practitioner and attorney, include fraud detection, 
interviewing skills, analysis and interpretation of financial statements, electronic discovery, general 
knowledge of rules of evidence and civil procedure and information, testifying, knowledge of relevant 
professional standards, etc. As shown in Table 1, the relative importance of enhanced skills for each 
industry practice (academia and practice) differ according to the need of the practice.  
4.2. Education  
Prior studies show evidence that forensic accounting practice appears to be gaining importance within 
academic institutions (e.g. Rezaee et al, 1996; Rezaee and Burton, 1997; Peterson and Reider, 1999, 
2001; Rezaee, 2002; Crumbley et al, 2003). The study of forensic accounting, as a branch of 
accounting, require broad multi-disciplinary knowledge particularly knowledge of business ethics, 
auditing, business activities, business (and corporate law), human behaviour and a working 
knowledge of the legal system. Unsurprisingly, there seem to be a consensus towards a 
multidisciplinary approach to fraud research (Enofe et al, 2013).  
Teaching forensic accounting to students in tertiary institutions has some benefits to educational 
stakeholders. Specifically, Buckhoff and Schrader (2000) show that incorporating forensic accounting 
as a course of study in the accounting curriculum benefits three major stakeholders in accounting 
education which are (i) academic institutions, (ii) students and (iii) the employers of accounting 
graduates. In a survey to assess the importance of forensic accounting among tertiary institutions, 
Peterson and Reider (2001) report that accounting instructors in universities acknowledge the 
importance of forensic accounting. Other studies examine the extent to which forensic-related courses 
are taught in the accounting curricula among tertiary institutions. Groomer and Heinz (1994) 
investigate whether forensic accounting related topics were taught in universities and find that fraud-
related topics were taught in internal auditing courses. Rezaee et al. (1996) find that few universities 
offer a course in fraud or forensic accounting. Buckhoff and Schrader (2000) examine the extent of 
forensic accounting education in the US and find that US universities consider forensic accounting to 
be moderately important for inclusion in the accounting curriculum. In contrast, other studies 
document diverging views on whether forensic accounting courses should be incorporated into the 
academic curricula. For instance, Rezaee and Burtin (1997) find that forensic accountants prefer to 
have forensic accounting as a stand-alone course while academics prefer to integrate forensic 
accounting into existing accounting courses. Further still, Rezaee et al. (1996) report some 
disagreements among practitioners and academics on the topical content of the forensic accounting 
curriculum. To date, the topical content of forensic accounting in the accounting curriculum is highly 
debated and remain a fruitful area for future research.  
4.3. Implications  
Although there appear to be some consensus on the skill-set of the forensic investigator, the 
importance of each skill will depend on the type of fraud event and the depth of investigation 
required. Moreover, the broad range of skills of the forensic investigator identified in the literature can 
further broaden the scope of topics to be included in forensic accounting education in tertiary 
institutions, which leads to a number of critical questions. First, it leads to the question about the 
whether it is appropriate for accounting (or forensic accounting) students to be taught topics in 
auditing, financial analysis, psychology, human behaviour, business ethics, criminology, law and 
other topics, when enrolling for a forensic accounting module.  
Secondly, there is the argument that if forensic accounting education in tertiary institutions cover a 
wide range of topics, each topic will not be taught in an in-depth manner during the usual yearly or 
termly syllabus within academic institutions either as a stand-alone course or as an integrated course. 
Therefore, there is the need to selectively determine the content or topics to be included in any 
forensic accounting syllabus to be taught in educational institutions or professional institutions such as 
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Moreover, the argument that tertiary institutions should 
focus on core auditing and financial reporting topics in their forensic accounting syllabus while 
professional institutions should focus on the legal and investigative content of forensic education is 
highly critical because it is difficult to distinguish between core and non-core topics that are relevant 
to forensic accounting education which also raise more questions about what topics should be 
included or excluded from the forensic accounting curriculum.  
Further, there are concerns that teaching the younger generation the techniques to detect fraud may 
not necessarily deter them from fraud but could teach them how to commit fraud without leaving 
traces, thus, leading to unintended consequences. Extensive forensic accounting education to students 
in tertiary institutions could lead to the emergence of a new breed of organized fraud perpetrators that 
do not leave traces of fraud because they know how to clean up the traces of fraud through the 
knowledge of fraud detection strategies they learnt in forensic accounting courses in tertiary 
institutions. The difficulty that regulators or forensic expert face is to deal with fraudster that do not 
leave fraud traces.  
To avoid this unintended consequence, a balance is needed between teaching students to detect fraud 
and how to de-motivate them from engaging in fraudulent practices. In response to this, it is tempting 
to advocate that the skills of fraud detection should only be taught to fraud investigators, potential 
forensic analyst and external auditors at professional institutions but not to student at tertiary 
institutions. Future research can be relied upon to find ways to balance the need to educate the 
younger generation on fraud detect strategies while at the same time ensuring that forensic education 
at universities do not motivate students to engage in fraud, thus, minimising the unintended 
consequences of forensic accounting education.  
 
5. Practical Issues: Research and Policy  
5.1. Detecting Fraud: Academics vs Regulators  
Academic studies attempt to formulate several checklists, red-flags or ‘boxes to tick’ as possible 
indicators of fraud. Hogan et al (2008) presents a literature review on this. The presence of one or 
more fraud symptom is often perceived as evidence or signals indicating fraud particularly when 
supported with evidence from statistical models such as logistic regression, data mining techniques. 
While academic research continue to maintain the symptom-based empirical (statistical) approach to 
detect fraud, regulators on the other hand do not necessarily maintain this view. Unlike academics, 
regulators (investigators) agree that there may be some relationship not necessarily a causal 
relationship between fraud symptoms and actual fraud. For this reason, regulators tend to match 
reported fraud symptoms with supplementary evidence beyond statistical reports to detect whether 
there is evidence of actual fraud. Such supplementary evidence may include interrogations, expert 
witness, interviews, etc.  
5.2. Fraud: 2 + 2 Do Not Always Equal 4  
In fraud detection, 2 + 2 do not always equal 4 every time, at least from a regulator’s perspective. This 
means that the presence of fraud symptoms does not necessarily imply that there is actual fraud. The 
literature highlight some symptoms of fraud, for example, Albrecht and Albrecht (2003) identified: 
internal control weaknesses, analytical anomalies, extravagant lifestyles, unusual behaviours, etc. 
While there appear to be some consensus that statistical models can aid the fraud detection process, it 
is critical that statistical-based fraud symptoms always lead to real fraud cases. In reality, all fraud 
symptoms do not lead to actual fraud 
Let’s take extravagant lifestyle as an example. Individuals who have a personal history of living 
extravagantly tend to maintain that kind of lifestyle when they become company executives and the 
occurrence of fraud in the organisation cannot always be attributed to the extravagant lifestyle of the 
individual. Only few studies raise this concern that fraud symptoms do not often lead to actual fraud 
cases (e.g. Albrecht and Romney, 1986; Hogan et al, 2008). Notably, Albrecht and Romney (1986) 
investigate some fraud symptom and observe that the investigation of fraud symptom did not produce 
evidence of actual fraud.  
5.3. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Fraud Investigation  
Investigation into every reported fraud case is costly to regulators (investigators). For this reason, it is 
unlikely that all reported fraud cases will receive full (and equal) investigative priority. Also, if each 
case is considered for investigation, significant resources will not be channelled equally to each fraud 
case. There are good reasons for this. One, investigating potential fraud cases involve committing 
significant amount of resources into the investigation with the aim to detect actual fraud. This activity 
is rewarding to investigators if the investigation leads to the identification of actual fraud where the 
fraud perpetrators would be penalized and subsequently fined which allows regulators (investigators) 
to recover the resources (monetary equivalent) committed to the investigation. On the other hand, 
when fraud investigation does not lead to actual fraud cases, significant amount of investigators’ 
resource is lost. Therefore, the possibility of losing resources committed to fraud investigation can 
affect the way regulators/investigators respond to fraud cases or events. Also, the cost associated with 
fraud investigation can deter regulators from giving every reported fraud case equal investigative 
priority. On the other hand, academics stress that each reported fraud case should be taken seriously 
and given full investigative priority. This is unlikely to be the case in reality because just as medical 
doctors do not consider all illnesses to be life-threatening and thus do not commit substantial medical 
resources to each category of illness, it is easy to understand why regulators react differently to some 
reported fraud cases than others. Therefore, the cost and benefit of fraud investigation provides an 
explanation for the diverging views between an academic and policy maker.  
5.4. Research and Policy Gap: why forensic accounting research does not inform policy  
Forensic accounting research should play an important role to inform practice (audit) and policy. The 
future of forensic accounting research will depend on its ability to inform policy. However, forensic 
academic research has done little to inform policy and supervisory rules for the following reasons.  
1) Empirical studies most focus on investigating firms that have a fraud history in the past. The 
knowledge that a number of firms committed fraud drives the researcher to employ several statistical 
tests to support his expectation for the existence of fraud in his/her analysis. This approach to fraud 
research is not particularly useful to regulators. Regulators are interested in detecting on-going 
fraudulent activities in firms while academic research focus on past fraud events. Academic research 
can inform policy if forensic accounting research shift its focus from firms with previous fraud history 
to firms that have no fraud history at all.  
2) Given the recent advances in the knowledge of human behaviour and financial engineering, 
regulators understand that statistical methods used to detect past fraud events do not have significant 
explanatory power to predict future fraud  
5.5. A Policy Note  
To inform policy, another classification of fraud that might appeal to regulators and practitioners is 
needed. The rationale for this classification is that while regulators oppose fraud, not all fraud cases in 
practice require regulatory sanction or discipline. This is because investigating fraudulent 
misbehaviours impose significant costs and may require committing substantial resources to 
investigate fraud. I propose that the investigative priority given to reported fraud events or cases 
should depend on (i) the magnitude of misrepresented transactions; (ii) the materiality of the 
accounting number involved; (iii) the extent of its deceptive intent, (iv) the hierarchical status of the 
perpetrator - individual or firm; and (v) whether the fraudulent behaviour is acceptable within 
acceptable industry standards. Accordingly, I classify fraud into ‘soft fraud’ and ‘hard fraud’. Soft 
fraud may be defined as any fraudulent practice by a firm or individual that is considered to be 
legitimate by industry standards/rules and practice but is perceived to be illegitimate outside the 
context of the industry. This kind of fraudulent practices includes, but not limited to, understating 
accrual expense, overstating profits, revenue manipulations, earnings management, etc. On the other 
hand, hard fraud is any fraudulent practice by a firm that is considered to be illegitimate within and 
outside the context of the industry. This kind of fraudulent practice includes, but not limited to, 
creating fictitious debtors and suppliers, etc. This type of fraud requires strict regulatory disciplinary 
actions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The review article examine several issues including the nature of fraud, forensic accounting, and the 
skills of the forensic investigators as well as issues associated with forensic accounting education. 
Some policy and practical implications are discussed. In conclusion, it is important to note that while 
forensic accounting is gaining significant research interests among academics, progress in forensic 
accounting research will depend on the extent to which fraud perpetrators leave traces of fraud 
assuming all fraud perpetrators do leave traces after committing fraud. In the coming years, regulators 
will be more concerned about fraud perpetrators who do not leave any trace of some sort. This will 
pose a problem to industry regulators if fraud perpetrators have thorough knowledge of accounting 
standards, auditing techniques and investigative skills, and such knowledge can help fraud 
perpetrators to eliminate all possible trace of fraud. Finally, progress in the forensic accounting 
literature will also depend on the extent to which forensic accounting informs practice and policy. 
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